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The arrival process of bidders and bids in online auctions is im-
portant for studying and modeling supply and demand in the online
marketplace. A popular assumption in the online auction literature is
that a Poisson bidder arrival process is a reasonable approximation.
This approximation underlies theoretical derivations, statistical mod-
els and simulations used in field studies. However, when it comes to
the bid arrivals, empirical research has shown that the process is far
from Poisson, with early bidding and last-moment bids taking place.
An additional feature that has been reported by various authors is an
apparent self-similarity in the bid arrival process. Despite the wide
evidence for the changing bidding intensities and the self-similarity,
there has been no rigorous attempt at developing a model that ad-
equately approximates bid arrivals and accounts for these features.
The goal of this paper is to introduce a family of distributions that
well-approximate the bid time distribution in hard-close auctions.
We call this the BARISTA process (Bid ARrivals In STAges) be-
cause of its ability to generate different intensities at different stages.
We describe the properties of this model, show how to simulate bid
arrivals from it, and how to use it for estimation and inference. We
illustrate its power and usefulness by fitting simulated and real data
from eBay.com. Finally, we show how a Poisson bidder arrival process
relates to a BARISTA bid arrival process.
1. Introduction and motivation. Empirical research of online auctions
has been flourishing in recent years due to the important role that these
auctions play in the marketplace, and the availability of large amounts of
high-quality bid data from websites such as eBay, Yahoo!, OnSale and uBid.
Many of the theoretical results derived for traditional (offline) auctions have
been shown to fail in the online setting for reasons such as globalism, comput-
erized bidding and the recording of complex bids, longer auction durations,
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more flexibility in design choice by the seller and issues of trust. A central
factor underlying many important results is the number of bidders partic-
ipating in the auction. Typically, it is assumed that this number is fixed
[Pinker et al. (2003)] or fixed but unknown [McAfee and McMillan (1997)].
In online auctions the number of bidders and bids is not predetermined, and
it is known to be affected by the auction design and its dynamics. Thus, in
both the theoretical and empirical domains the number of bidders and bids
plays an important role.
We propose a new and flexible model for the bid arrival process. Hav-
ing a model for bid arrivals has several important implications. First, many
researchers in the online auction arena use simulated bid arrival data to vali-
date their results. Bapna et al. (2002), for example, use simulated bid arrival
data to validate their model on a bidder’s willingness to pay. Gwebu et al.
(2005) design a complex simulation study to analyze bidders’ strategies us-
ing assumptions about the bidder, as well as bid arrival rates. It has also
been noted that the placement of bids influences the bidder arrival process
[Beam et al. (1996)]. Hlasny (2006) reviews several econometric procedures
for testing for the presence of latent shill-bidding (where sellers fraudulently
bid on their own item) based on the arrival rate of bids. While a clear un-
derstanding of the process of bidding can have an impact on the theoretical
literature, it can also be useful in many applications. These range from auto-
mated electronic negotiation through monitoring auction server performance
to designing automated bidding agents. For instance, Menasce and Akula
(2004) study the connection between bid arrivals and auction server per-
formance. They find that the commonly encountered “last minute bidding”
creates a huge surge in the workload of auction servers and degrades their
performance. They then suggest a model to improve a server’s performance
through auction rescheduling using simulated bid arrival data.
Modeling the bid arrival process rather than the bidder arrivals also
promises to produce more reliable results, because bid placements are typ-
ically completely observable from the auction’s bid history, whereas bidder
arrivals are not. eBay, for instance, posts the temporal sequence of all the
bids placed over the course of the auction. In particular, every time a bid
is placed its exact time-stamp is posted. In contrast, the time when bidders
first arrive at an auction is unobservable from the bid history. Bidders can
browse an auction without placing a bid, thereby not leaving a trace or re-
vealing their interest in that auction. That is, they can look at a particular
auction, inform themselves about current bid- and competition-levels in that
auction, and make decisions about their bidding strategies. All this activity
can take place without leaving an observable trace in the bid history that
the auction site makes public. In fact, it is likely that bidders first browse an
auction and only later place their bid. The gap between the bidder arrival
time and bid placement also means that the bidder arrival is not identical to
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the bid arrival, and can therefore not be inferred directly from the observed
bid times. Another issue is that most online auctions allow bid-revision,
and therefore many bidders place multiple bids. This further adds to the
obscurity of defining the bidder arrival-departure process. Our approach is
therefore to model the bid arrival process based on empirical evidence.
The current literature, based on publicly-available bid data, reports strong
evidence of two major features of the bid arrival process in online auctions:
(1) a nonhomogenous intensity that possesses two or three distinct stages,
and (2) a self-similarity effect in the distribution of bid arrival times. We
describe these in Section 2. However, aside from noting these features, no
model has been suggested for approximating the bid arrival process that
addresses these two features. In light of the absence of such a model, we
introduce the BARISTA process, a model that well-approximates bid arrivals
in online auctions. Section 3 introduces the model and its properties, and
describes two special cases. Section 4 describes a method for simulating data
from this process and several methods for estimating model parameters. In
Section 5 we use simulated data and a diverse set of real bid data from eBay
to illustrate the estimation and model fit. In addition to the various uses
of the bid arrival model, one might be able to infer bidder strategies from
the aggregate bid arrival process. In Section 6 we tie the bid and bidder
arrival processes, proposing several bidding strategies that would lead to
BARISTA-type bid arrivals. In Section 7 we conclude and suggest future
enhancements.
2. Features of bid arrivals. We start by describing two prominent fea-
tures of bid arrivals that have been reported in the literature, and follow
with an illustration using bid data from eBay.
2.1. Multi-stage arrival intensities. Time-limited tasks are omnipresent
in the offline world: voting for a new president, purchasing tickets for a
popular movie or sporting event, filing one’s federal taxes, etc. In many of
these cases arrivals are especially intense as the deadline approaches. For
instance, during the 2001 political elections in Italy, more than 20 million
voters cast their ballots between 13:00–22:00 [Bruschi et al. (2002)], when
ballots were scheduled to close at 22:00. Similarly, a high proportion of
U.S. tax returns are filed near the 15 April deadline. For instance, about
one-third of all returns are not filed until the last two weeks of tax season
(www.heraldstandard.com/site/news.cfm?newsid=14359378&BRD=2280&PAG=461&dept_id=480247&rfi=6).
According to Ariely et al. (2005), deadline effects have been noted in stud-
ies of bargaining, where agreements are reached in the final moments be-
fore the deadline [Roth et al. (1998)]. Such effects have been shown among
animals, which respond more vigorously toward the expected end of a rein-
forcement schedule, and in human task completion where individuals be-
come increasingly impatient toward the task’s end. Furthermore, people
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use different strategies when games are framed as getting close to the end
[even when these are arbitrary break points; Croson (1996)]. In addition to
the deadline effect, there is an effect of earliness where the strategic use of
time moves transactions earlier than later, for example, in the labor market
[Roth and Xing (1994); Avery et al. (2001)].
Such deadline and earliness effects have also been observed in the on-
line environment. Several researchers have noted deadline effects in internet
auctions [Bajari and Hortacsu (2000); Borle et al. (2006); Ku et al. (2004);
Roth and Ockenfels (2000); Wilcox (2000)]. In many of these studies it was
observed that a nonnegligible percent of bids arrive at the very last minute
of the auction. This phenomenon, called “bid sniping,” has received much
attention, and numerous explanations have been suggested to explain its
existence. Empirical studies of online auctions have also reported an un-
usual amount of bidding activity at the auction start followed by a longer
period of little or no activity [Borle et al. (2006); Jank and Shmueli (2007)].
Bapna et al. (2003) refer to bidders who place a single early bid as “eval-
uators.” Finally, “bid shilling,” a fraudulent act where the seller places
dummy bids to drive up the price, is associated with early and high bidding
[Kauffman and Wood (2000)]. The existence of these bid-timing phenomena
are important factors in determining outcomes at the auction level, as well
as at the market level. They have therefore received much attention from
the research community.
2.2. Self-similarity (and its breakdown). While both the offline and on-
line environments share the deadline and earliness effects, the online environ-
ment appears to possess the additional property of self-similarity in the bid
arrival process [this property was also found in the offline process of bargain-
ing agreements, as described in Roth and Ockenfels (2000)]. Self-similarity
refers to the “striking regularity” of shape that can be found among the dis-
tribution of bid arrivals over the intervals [t, T ], as t approaches the auction
deadline T . Self-similarity is central in applications such as web, network and
ethernet traffic. Huberman and Adamic (1999) found that the number of
visitors to websites follows a universal power law. Liebovitch and Schwartz
(2003) reported that the arrival process of email viruses is self-similar. How-
ever, this has also been reported in other online environments. For instance,
Aurell and Hemmingsson (1997) showed that times between bids in the in-
terbank foreign exchange market follow a power law distribution.
Several authors reported results that indicate the presence of self-similarity
in the bidding frequency in online auctions. Roth and Ockenfels (2000) found
that the arrival of last bids by bidders during an online auction is closely
related to a self-similar process. They approximated the CDF of bid arrivals
in “reverse time” (i.e., the CDF of the elapsed times between the bid ar-
rivals and the auction deadline) by the power functional form FT (t) = (t/T )
α
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(α > 0), over the interval [0, T ], and estimated α from the data using OLS.
This approximates the distribution of bids over intervals that range from
the last 12 hours to the last 10 minutes, but accounts for neither the final
minutes of the auction nor the auction start and middle. Yang et al. (2003)
found that the number of bids and the number of bidders in auctions on eBay
and on its Korean partner (auction.co.kr) follow a power law distribution.
This was found for auctions across multiple categories. The importance of
this finding, which is closely related to the self-similarity property, is that the
more bidding one observes up to a fixed time point, the higher the likelihood
of seeing another bid before the next time point. According to Yang et al.
(2003), such power-law behaviors imply that the online auction system is
driven by self-organized processes, involving all bidders who participate in
a given auction activity.
The implications of bid arrivals following a self-similar process instead of
an ordinary Poisson model are significant: The levels of activity throughout
an auction with self-similar bid arrivals would increase at a much faster rate
than expected under a Poisson model. It would be especially meaningful
toward the end of the auction, which has a large impact on the bid amount
process and the final price. The self-similar property suggests that the rate
of incoming bids increases steadily as the auction approaches its end. In-
deed, empirical investigations have found that many bidders wait until the
very last possible moment to submit their final bid. By doing so, they hope
to increase their chance of winning the auction since the probability that
another competitor successfully places an even higher bid before closing is
diminishing. This common bidding strategy of “bid sniping” (or “last minute
bidding”) would suggest a steadily increasing flow of bid arrivals toward the
auction end. However, empirical evidence from online auction data indicates
that bid times over the last minute or so of hard-close auctions tend to fol-
low a uniform distribution [Roth et al. (1998)]. This has not been found in
soft-close, or “going-going-gone” auctions, such as those on Amazon, Yahoo!
or uBid.com, where the auction continues several minutes after the last bid
is placed.
Thus, in addition to the evidence for self-similarity in online auctions,
there is also evidence of its breakdown during the very last moments of a
hard-close auction. Roth and Ockenfels (2000) note that the empirical CDF
plots for intervals that range between the last 12 hours of the auction and
the last 1 minute all look very similar except for the last 1-minute plot.
Being able to model this breakdown is essential, since the last moments of
the auction (when sniping takes place) are known to be crucial to the final
price. In the absence of such a model, we introduce a bid arrival process
that describes the frequency throughout the entire auction. Rather than
focusing on the last several hours and excluding the last moments, our model
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accommodates the changes in bidding intensity from the very start to the
very end of a hard-close auction.
To illustrate the self-similarity in the bid arrival process in online auc-
tions, we collected data on 189 7-day auctions (with a total of 3651 bid
times) on eBay.com for new Palm M515 Personal Digital Assistants. Fig-
ure 1 displays the empirical CDFs for the 3651 bid arrivals for the purposes
of examining the self-similarity property. The CDF is plotted at several res-
olutions, “zooming-in” from the entire auction duration (of 7 days) to the
last day, last 12-hours, 6-hours, 3-hours, 5-minutes, 2-minutes and the very
last minute. We see that (1) the last day curve (thick black) is different
from the other curves in that it starts out concave, (2) the last day through
last 3-hour curves (red) are all very similar to each other, and (3) the last
minutes curves (grey) gradually approach the 1-minute curve which is nearly
uniform. These visual similarities are confirmed by the results of two-sample
Kolmogorov–Smirnoff tests where we compared all the pairs of distributions
and found similarities only among the curves within each of the three groups.
This replicates the results in Roth and Ockenfels (2000) where self-similarity
was observed in the bid time distributions of the last 12-hour, 6-hour, 3-
hour, 1-hour, 30-minute and 10-minute periods of the auction, and where
this self-similarity breaks down in the last minute of the auction to become
a uniform distribution. However, we examine a few additional time reso-
lutions which give further insight: First, by looking at the last 5-minutes
and last 2-minutes bid distributions, we see that the self-similarity gradu-
ally transitions into the 1-minute uniform distribution. Second, our inspec-
tion of the entire auction duration [which was unavailable in the study by
Roth and Ockenfels (2000)] reveals an additional early-bidding stage. Self-
similarity, it appears, is not prevalent throughout the entire auction dura-
tion! Such a phenomenon can occur if the probability of a bid not getting
registered on the auction site is positive at the last moments of the auction,
and increases as the auction comes to a close. There are various factors that
may cause a bid to not get registered. One possible reason is the time it
takes to manually place a bid [Roth and Ockenfels (2000) found that most
last minute bidders tend to place their bids manually rather than through
available sniping software agents]. Other reasons are hardware difficulties,
Internet congestion, unexpected latency and server problems on eBay (see,
e.g., www.auctionsniper.com). Clearly, the closer to the end the auction
gets, the higher the likelihood that a bid will not get registered successfully.
This increasing likelihood of an unsuccessful bid counteracts the increasing
flow of last minute bids. The result is a uniform bid arrival process that
“contaminates” the self-similarity, of the arrivals until that point.
In the next section we introduce a flexible nonhomogeneous Poisson pro-
cess (NHPP) that captures the empirical phenomenon described above. In
addition to the self-similarity, it also accounts for the two observed phenom-
ena of “early bidding” and “last minute bidding” (sniping).
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Fig. 1. Empirical CDFs of number of bids in 189 Palm M515 auctions overlaid.
3. The BARISTA: A three-stage nonhomogeneous Poisson process. We
introduce a process that captures the two main features of arrivals in online
auctions: the three stages and the self-similarity (with its breakdown). We
call this the BARISTA (Bid ARrivals In STAges) process, because it gen-
erates different intensities of activity [we also call the stages the “espresso
stage” (short and intense), “macchiato stage” (stained) and “ristretto stage”
(extra intense), and hence the BARISTA]:
Stage 1. The auction start, characterized by an early burst of activity,
Stage 2. The mid-auction bid arrivals, characterized by increasing bid inten-
sity and self-similarity that is gradually contaminated as the 3rd stage is
approached, and
Stage 3. The last moments of the auction, characterized by very intense
activity dampened possibly by bids that are not successfully transmitted.
3.1. Model formulation. A nonhomogeneous Poisson process differs from
an ordinary Poisson process in that its intensity is not a constant, but rather
a function of time. We introduce a particular intensity function that captures
the three-stage dynamics described above. Suppose bids arrive during [0, T ]
in accordance with a nonhomogeneous Poisson process N(s), 0≤ s≤ T, with
intensity function
λ(s) =

c
(
1− d1
T
)α2−α1(
1− s
T
)α1−1
, for 0≤ s≤ d1,
c
(
1− s
T
)α2−1
, for d1 ≤ s≤ T − d2,
c
(
d2
T
)α2−α3(
1− s
T
)α3−1
, for T − d2 ≤ s≤ T ,
(1)
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where c > 0, αj > 0 for j = 1,2,3, T is a known constant, and 0≤ d1 < T −
d2 ≤ T . Note that this intensity function is continuous, so there are no jumps
at times d1 and T −d2. The random variable N(s) which counts the number
of arrivals until time s follows a Poisson distribution with mean
m(s) =

K
(
1−
(
1− s
T
)α1)
, for 0≤ s≤ d1
K
(
1−
(
1− d1
T
)α1)
+
Tc
α2
((
1− d1
T
)α2
−
(
1− s
T
)α2)
,
for d1 ≤ s≤ T − d2,
K
(
1−
(
1− d1
T
)α1)
+
Tc
α2
((
1− d1
T
)α2
−
(
d2
T
)α2)
+
Tc
α3
(
d2
T
)α2−α3((d2
T
)α3
−
(
1− s
T
)α3)
,
for T − d2 ≤ s≤ T,
(2)
where K = Tcα1 (1− d1T )α2−α1 .
Given that N(T ) = n, the collection of arrival times are equivalent to the
order statistics of a random sample of size n from the distribution having
distribution F (s) =m(s)/m(T ):
F (s) =

CT
α1
(
1− d1
T
)α2−α1[
1−
(
1− s
T
)α1]
,
for 0≤ s≤ d1,
CT
α1α2
[
(α1 − α2)
(
1− d1
T
)α2
+ α2
(
1− d1
T
)α2−α1
− α1
(
1− s
T
)α2]
,
for d1 ≤ s≤ T − d2,
1− CT
α3
(
d2
T
)α2−α3(
1− s
T
)α3
, for T − d2 ≤ s≤ T.
(3)
Note that for the interval d1 ≤ s≤ T − d2 we can write the CDF as
F (s) = F (d1) +
CT
α2
[(
1− d1
T
)α2
−
(
1− s
T
)α2]
,(4)
where
C = c/m(T )
=
α1α2α3/T
(1− d1/T )α2α3(α1 −α2) +α3α2(1− d1/T )α2−α1 + (d2/T )α2α1(α2 − α3) .
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The density function corresponding to this process is given by
f(s) =

C
(
1− d1
T
)α2−α1(
1− s
T
)α1−1
, for 0≤ s≤ d1,
C
(
1− s
T
)α2−1
, for d1 ≤ s≤ T − d2,
C
(
d2
T
)α2−α3(
1− s
T
)α3−1
, for T − d2 ≤ s≤ T .
(5)
We expect α3 to be close to 1 (uniform arrival of bids at the end of the
auction) and α1 > 1 to represent the early surge in bidding.
3.2. Properties of the BARISTA process. The process described by (1)–
(4) has two properties that lead to a wide family of processes, and that can
be useful in practice. We describe each property and its implications below.
3.2.1. An additive property. IfNk, 1≤ k ≤m, are independent BARISTA
processes having c parameters c1, . . . , cm and common (α1, α2, α3), (d1, d2)
and T parameters, then the aggregated processN =
∑
1≤k≤mNk is a BARISTA
with parameters (α1, α2, α3), (d1, d2), T , and c=
∑
1≤k≤m ck.
This means that the bid arrival times from several auctions may be aggre-
gated and treated as though they were generated by a single auction, pro-
vided that each original auction can be regarded as producing a BARISTA
process with the same (or nearly the same) parameters. The advantage of
aggregation is more accurate parameter estimation.
3.2.2. A regenerative property. An observer who counts only the bid ar-
rivals occurring after time βT , some 0≤ β < 1, sees the process
Nβ(s) :=N(s)−N(βT ), βT ≤ s≤ T.
Nβ is an NHPP with intensity function λβ = λ, restricted to the interval
[βT,T ].
Taking βT as the new zero, and recording time on a new (faster) clock
where one new minute (a shminute) = (1−β) minutes on the original clock,
we can write λβ as
λβ(s) =

cβ
(
1− d1,β
Tβ
)α2−α1(
1− s
T
)α1−1
, 0≤ s≤ d1,β,
cβ
(
1− s
Tβ
)α2−1
, d1,β ≤ s≤ Tβ − d2,β,
cβ
(
d2,β
Tβ
)α2−α3(
1− s
Tβ
)α3−1
, Tβ − d2,β ≤ s≤ Tβ,
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where cβ = c(1 − β)α2−1, d1,β = max(d1 − βT,0), d2,β = min(d2, Tβ), and
Tβ = (1− β)T . Thus, λβ has the same form as our original λ with λ= λ0 in
the new notation.
This regenerative property means that we can use the BARISTA model
to approximate bid arrivals in an ongoing auction, not only in a completed
auction. One application where this is useful is in real-time forecasting of
future bid times, such as for the purpose of optimizing server performance.
3.3. Special cases. In empirical studies, d1 appears to be small (1–2 days)
and d2 very small (a few minutes) compared to T (several days). Thus, most
of the BARISTA process is realized in the second stage, during which the
process can be regarded as having contaminated self-similarity. The con-
tamination is caused by the bid arrivals in the third stage, and increases as
s→ T − d2.
When d1 = d2 = 0, the BARISTA process reduces to a single-stage process
(NHPP1) with an intensity function λ(s) = c(1− sT )α−1 and associated CDF
function F (s) = 1− (1− sT )α,0≤ s≤ T. For (θ, t) ∈ [0,1]× (0, T ], we have
1− F (T − tθ)
1−F (T − t) = θ
α (independent of t),
and thus, we have a pure self-similar process. The joint MLE of (α, c) is
obtainable in this case (see Appendix A):
α̂=−N(T )
[N(T )∑
i=1
ln
(
1− Xi
T
)]−1
, ĉ=
N(T )α̂
T
.
SinceX ∼ F =⇒− ln(1− XT )∼ exp(rate = α), and limc→∞Pr(N(T )→∞) =
1, a conditioning argument on N(T ) yields an asymptotic result:√
N(T )
(
α
α̂
− 1
)
D→N(0,1) as c→∞,
where N(0,1) indicates a standard normal distribution.
When d1 = 0, the BARISTA process reduces to a two-stage process (NHPP2),
with a single changepoint at T − d2. This process is useful for modeling bid
arrivals in auctions that lack the initial surge of early bidding. For further
technical details on these special cases, see Shmueli et al. (2004).
4. Fitting the BARISTA to data. Simulated bid arrivals are useful in
field experiments, in evaluation of model fit, and for quantifying sampling
error. The method is simple to program and computationally efficient.
Fitting the BARISTA process to data requires estimating the two
changepoints and three α parameters. We introduce three estimation meth-
ods that range in their computational intensiveness and accuracy (Matlab
code for the simulation and estimation procedures is available at
http://www.smith.umd.edu/ceme/statistics/code.html).
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4.1. Process simulation. To simulate n observations from the BARISTA
process on the interval [0, T ], we use the inversion method and apply the
inverse CDF to a simulated random sample of U(0,1) variates. In particular,
the inverse CDF can be written as
F−1(s) =

T − T
{
1− sα1
CT
(
1− d1
T
)α1−α2}1/α1
,
for 0≤ s≤ d1,
T − T
{(
1− d1
T
)α2
− α2
CT
(s−F3(d1))
}1/α2
,
for d1 ≤ s≤ T − d2,
T − T
{
α3
CT
(1− s)
(
d2
T
)α3−α2}1/α3
, for T − d2 ≤ s≤ T .
(6)
The algorithm for generating n arrivals (x1, . . . , xn) is then:
(1) Generate n uniform variates u1, . . . , un.
(2) For k = 1, . . . , n, set
xk =

T − T
{
1− ukα1
CT
(
1− d1
T
)α1−α2}1/α1
,
if uk <F (d1),
T − T
{
α2
CT
(F3(d1)− uk) +
(
1− d1
T
)α2}1/α2
,
if F (d1)≤ uk <F (T − d2),
T − T
{
α3
CT
uk
(
d2
T
)α3−α2}1/α3
, if uk ≥ F (T − d2).
(7)
Note that we fix the number of bid arrivals (n) rather than a randomly
generated number, since the estimators are of the same form in both cases
(see Appendix A). In order to generate a random number of bids under the
BARISTA model, one would generate a variate from a Poisson distribution
with mean m(T ) [see equation (2)].
4.2. Parameter estimation. We describe three estimation methods each
having a different tradeoff between computational intensity and accuracy,
and with varying amounts of required user input.
4.2.1. Quick and crude (CDF-based) estimation. The estimation of the
α parameters depends on the changepoints d1, T − d2 and vice-versa. As a
crude start, we choose three intervals of the form [T − t, T − s] that we are
confident lie in the first, second or third stages, and use those for estimating
the α parameters. We then use the α estimates to obtain estimates for the
changepoints.
In both cases the estimates are based on writing the parameters as a
function of the CDF, and then substituting the empirical CDF to obtain
estimates.
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Estimation of α parameters. From (3) it can be seen that in each interval
the CDF of the BARISTA process is in the form F (t) = βj − θj(1− tT )αj ,
(j = 1,2,3), and therefore the same approximation works on each of the
three intervals [0, d1], [d1, T − d2] and [T − d2, T ]. After choosing intervals
[T − t, T − s] that we are confident lie in stage j (the first, second or third
stage), we have
F (T − t)−F (T −√st)
F (T −√st)− F (T − s)
=
θj[1− (1− (T − t)/T )αj ]− θj[1− (1− (T −
√
st)/T )αj ]
θj[1− (1− (T −
√
st)/T )αj ]− θj[1− (1− (T − s)/T )αj ]
(8)
=
(ts)αj/2 − tαj
sαj − (st)αj/2 =
(sαj/2 − tαj/2)tαj/2
(sαj/2 − tαj/2)sαj/2 =
(
t
s
)αj/2
.
The relevant α is given by
αj = 2
ln[F (T − t)−F (T −√st)]− ln[F (T −√st)−F (T − s)]
ln t− lns .(9)
We then estimate αj by substituting F with the empirical CDF Fe =N(t)/N(T )
in the approximation.
For α3, we can use the exact relation
α3 =
ln[R(t3)/R(t
′
3)]
ln[(T − t3)/(T − t′3)]
,(10)
where R(t) = 1− F (t) and t3, t′3 are within [T − d2, T ]. To estimate α3, we
choose reasonable values of t3, t
′
3 and use the empirical survival function
Re = 1−Fe.
Obtaining standard errors for these estimators can be done by bootstrap-
ping [see Efron and Tibshirani (1993) for details], due to the low computa-
tional effort involved in this estimation method.
To assess this method, we simulated 5000 random observations from
the BARISTA process on the interval [0,7] with parameters α1 = 3, α2 =
0.4, α3 = 1 and the changepoints d1 = 2.5 (defining the first 2.5 days as the
first stage) and d2 = 5/10080 (defining the last 5 minutes as the third stage).
The intensity function for these data is shown in Figure 2, and parameter
estimates with their standard errors are given in Table 1.
To study the robustness of the estimators to the choice of t and s, we
computed the quick and crude estimate for α1 on a range of intervals of the
form [0.001, t1], where 0.5 ≤ t1 ≤ 5. Note that this interval includes values
that are outside the range [0, d1 = 2.5]. The left panel in Figure 3 illustrates
the estimates obtained for these intervals. For values of t1 between 1.5–3.5
days, the estimate for α1 is relatively stable and close to 3. Similarly, the
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right panel in Figure 3 describes the estimates of α3, using (10), as a function
of the choice of t3 with t
′
3 = 7− 1/10080. The estimate is relatively stable
and close to 1.
For estimating α2, an interval such as [3,6.9] is reasonable. Figure 4 shows
the estimate as a function of the interval choice. It is clear that the estimate
is relatively insensitive to the exact interval choice, as long as it is reason-
able.
Estimation of d1 and d2. Using functions of the CDF, we obtain expressions
for d1 and d2. Let t1, t2, t
′
2 and t3 be such that 0 ≤ t1 ≤ d1, d1 ≤ t′2 < t2 ≤
T − d2, and T − d2 ≤ t3 < T . For d1, we use the ratio F3(t2)−F3(t
′
2)
F3(t1)
and for
d2, we use the ratio
F3(t2)−F3(t′2)
1−F3(t3)
. These lead to the following expressions:
d1 = T − T
{
α1
α2
· F (t1)
F (t2)− F (t′2)
· (1− t
′
2/T )
α2 − (1− t2/T )α2
1− (1− t1/T )α1
}1/(α2−α1)
,(11)
Fig. 2. Intensity function λ(s) for simulated data, where α1 = 3, α2 = 0.4, α3 = 1,
d1 = 2.5, d2 = 7 − 5/10080, and c = 1. Note the different time scale for the last 5 min-
utes (right panel).
Fig. 3. Quick estimates of α1, α2 and α3 as a function of the input intervals, for simu-
lated BARISTA process data.
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d2 = T
{
α3
α2
· 1−F (t)
F (t2)−F (t′2)
· (1− t
′
2/T )
α2 − (1− t2/T )α2
(1− t3/T )α3
}1/(α2−α3)
.(12)
We can therefore estimate d1 and d2 by selecting “safe” values for t1, t
′
2, t2
and t3 (which are confidently within the relevant interval) and using the
empirical CDF at those points.
Using this method, we estimated d1 and d2 for the simulated data. We
used the true values of the α parameters and the “safe” values t1 = 1, t
′
2 =
3, t2 = 6, and t3 = 7−2/10080. The estimates and their (bootstrap) standard
errors are reported in Table 1. Figure 5 shows the robustness of the estimates
to the choice of the “safe” values. It can be seen that d1 estimates are stable
between 2.4–2.6 even if we choose t1 slightly outside of the first interval
[0,2.5]. d2 estimates are between 3–5.5 minutes even when t3 is dislocated
by a few minutes into the second interval.
Estimation of c. The estimate of the parameter c is based on the estimate
θ̂ of the other parameters θ = (α1, α2, α3, d1, d2), and the observed number
N(T ) of bids placed on [0, T ]. Define g(θ; s) = λ(s)/c, 0≤ s≤ T, where λ is
the function in (1). We have
N(T )≈E[N(T )] = c
∫ T
0
g(θ; s)ds≈ c
∫ T
0
g(θ̂; s)ds.
Solving for c, we obtain the estimate
ĉ=
N(T )∫ T
0 g(θ̂; s)ds
.
Fig. 4. Quick and crude estimate of α2 as a function of [t
′
2, t2] choice. αˆ2 is between
0.4–0.55 in the entire range of intervals. The more extreme intervals (t′2 < 3.4 or t2 > 6.8)
yield αˆ2 = 0.4.
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Fig. 5. Graphs of dˆ1 vs. t1 (left) and dˆ2 vs. initial values of T − t3 (right) for simulated
data. The estimate for d1 is stable at ≈ 2.5. dˆ2 using the last 2–5 minute interval is in the
range of 4–5 minutes.
If θ̂ is an MLE of θ, then ĉ is an MLE of c.
4.2.2. Maximum likelihood estimation. Conditional on N(T ) = n (see
Appendix A for unconditional estimation), the BARISTA likelihood func-
tion is given by
L(x1, . . . , xn|α1, α2, α3, d1, d2)
= n lnC + n1(α2 − α1) ln
(
1− d1
T
)
+ n3(α2 − α3) ln d2
T
(13)
+ (α1 − 1)S1 + (α2 − 1)S2 + (α3 − 1)S3,
where n1 is the number of arrivals before time d1, n3 is the number of
arrivals after T − d2, S1 =
∑
i:xi≤d1 ln(1− xiT ), S2 =
∑
i:d1<xi<T−d2 ln(1− xiT )
and S3 =
∑
i:xi>T−d2 ln(1− xiT ).
In order to estimate α1, α2, α3 for given values of d1, d2, the following
three equations must be solved (equating the first derivatives in α1, α2, α3
to zero):
S1 = n1 ln
(
1− d1
T
)
− n
C
∂C
∂α1
,(14)
S2 =−n1 ln
(
1− d1
T
)
− n3 ln d2
T
− n
C
∂C
∂α2
,(15)
S3 = n3 ln
d2
T
− n
C
∂C
∂α3
,(16)
where
∂C
∂α1
=
C2T
α21
(
1− d1
T
)α2[(
1− d1
T
)−α1(
1 + α1 ln
(
1− d1
T
))
− 1
]
,(17)
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∂C
∂α2
=
C2T
α1α3α22
{
α3
(
1− d1
T
)α2
×
[
α2 ln
(
1− d1
T
)(
α2 −α1 + α2
(
1− d1
T
)−α1)
− α1
]
+ α1
(
d2
T
)α2[
α3 + α2 ln
d2
T
(α2 − α3)
]}
(18)
=
C2T
α22
[(
d2
T
)α2
−
(
1− d1
T
)α2
− α
2
2
α1
(
1− d1
T
)α2
ln
(
1− d1
T
)(
1−
(
1− d1
T
)−α1)
−α2
(
d2
T
)α2
ln
d2
T
+α2
(
1− d1
T
)α2
ln
(
1− d1
T
)
+
α22
α3
(
d2
T
)α2
ln
d2
T
]
,
∂C
∂α3
=
C2T
α23
(
d2
T
)α2
.(19)
Since the equations are nonlinear in the parameters, an iterative gradient
method can be used (the second derivatives are given in Appendix B). This
can be solved using an iterative gradient-based method such as Newton
Raphson or the Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–Powell (BFGP) method, which
is a more stable quasi-Newton method that does not require the compu-
tation and inversion of the Hessian matrix [see, e.g., Dennis and Schnabel
(1983)]. If the changepoints d1 and d2 are unknown and we want to estimate
them from the data, then search algorithms such as genetic algorithms can
be more efficient, more stable and more easily programmable for finding a
solution. Otherwise, the likelihood needs to be computed for a grid of d1×d2
values. In addition, empirical evidence suggests that gradient methods tend
to be unstable for solving this maximization problem. In short, an exhaus-
tive search over a reasonable grid of the parameter space or a stochastic
search algorithm are good practical solutions. A good starting value would
be the estimate obtained from the quick and crude method.
Genetic algorithm search. An alternative to an exhaustive search is the
genetic algorithm (GA). The genetic algorithm belongs to a general class
of stochastic, global optimization procedures that imitate the evolutionary
process of nature. The basic building blocks of GA are crossover, mutation
and selection—similar to their biological counterparts found in the evolu-
tion of genes. GA is an iterative process and each iteration is called a new
generation. Starting from a parent population, two parents create offspring
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Fig. 6. 500 generations of the GA for the simulated data.
via crossover and mutation. The crossover operator imitates the mixing of
genetic information during sexual reproduction. The mutation operator im-
itates the occasional changes of genetic information due to external influ-
ences. An offspring’s fitness is evaluated relative to an objective function.
The offspring with the highest fitness is then selected for further reproduc-
tion. Although GAs’ operations appear heuristic, Holland (1975) provides
theoretical arguments for convergence to a high quality optimum.
We use a GA to estimate the parameters of the BARISTA process as fol-
lows. After creating the parent population of size S = 100, we select the top
10% of parents with the highest fitness and perform crossover and mutation
on a randomly chosen pair, thereby creating a pair of new offspring. We re-
peat this 50 times to obtain an offspring population of the same size S as the
parent population. After creating a set of suitable offspring, the next step is
to evaluate an offspring’s fitness. One approach is to evaluate an offspring’s
fitness according to its likelihood value. Let θ denote an offspring and let
L(θ) = L(x1, . . . , xn|θ) denote the corresponding likelihood value. For two
offspring θ1 and θ2, θ1 has higher fitness if L(θ1)> L(θ2).
We ran a GA on the simulated data, restricting the range of possible
solutions to the hypercube (α1, α2, α3, d1, d2) ∈ [1,15] × [0.1,1] × [0.5,15] ×
[1,5]× [0,0.01], and running it for a total of 500 generations. Figure 6 shows
a graph of the fitness-history over the 500 generations. We see that after
generation 300, there are barely any further improvements. Our parameter
estimates are taken from the last generation. This yielded the estimates and
standard errors given in Table 1. All of these estimates are in line with the
quick and crude estimates, and are very close to the values used to generate
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the data. The combined numerical maximization and grid search procedure
did not converge.
4.2.3. Model selection. Although we posit that a three-stage model is, at
least in general, most suitable for describing the bid arrival process in online
auctions, it is possible to extend the estimation process to include model
selection. To allow for a more flexible family of distributions, we consider the
family of one-stage (NHPP1), two-stage (NHPP2) and 3-stage (BARISTA)
models. Since the first two are nested within the BARISTA model, we can
choose the best model using likelihood-ratios. To compare a 3-stage with a
2-stage model, for instance, we use the statistic
− 2{L(NHPP2)−L(BARISTA)},(20)
where L(i) is the log-likelihood for model i. Under the null hypothesis that
the models are equivalent in their ability to fit the data (i.e., the NHPP2
is sufficient), the statistic follows a χ2(p) distribution with p = 5 − 3 = 2
degrees of freedom (the difference in the number of parameters of the two
models). If the p-value is sufficiently small, then it is reasonable to choose the
3-stage model, whereas a large p-value would indicate the use of the 2-stage
model. A similar statistic can be designed to test the difference between the
1-stage and 2-stage models, which would also follow a χ2 distribution, again
with p= 3− 1 = 2 degrees of freedom.
This test statistic can be used in conjunction with any of the estimation
methods that we described. The most comprehensive and computationally
intensive option is to find the “best” 1-stage, “best” 2-stage and “best” 3-
stage models (in the sense of the highest likelihood values), and compare
them using the likelihood-ratio test. A more practical alternative is to com-
bine the model selection with a stochastic search algorithm. In particular, we
incorporated model selection into the genetic algorithm as follows. Starting
Table 1
True and estimated values (with standard errors) for the BARISTA model parameters, by
method
dˆ2
αˆ1 αˆ2 αˆ3 dˆ1 (minutes)
Simulated
(true)
values 3 0.4 1 2.5 5
CDF-based
Q&C 2.85 (0.06) 0.443 (0.001) 0.954 (0.0132) 2.5 (0.0036) 4.7 (0.13)
Genetic
algorithm 2.88 (0.007) 0.387 (0.005) 0.997 (0.009) 2.63 (0.0044) 4.6 (0.42)
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Table 2
Information for 9 datasets on three different types of
items and three different auction durations
7-day 5-day 3-day
Xbox #bids 1861 393 557
#auctions 93 21 35
Palm #bids 3832 869 1216
#auctions 194 54 35
Cartier #bids 1348 355 250
#auctions 97 21 18
with the simplest model, NHPP1, we apply the GA to obtain the parameter
estimates and the associated log-likelihood value, L1. NHPP1 is the most
parsimonious model and we only move to a more complex model if the data
justify that choice. We hence continue by fitting an NHPP2 and obtaining
the log-likelihood value L2. We compute the likelihood-ratio statistic (20)
and the associated p-value. If the statistic is significant (p-value < 0.05),
then we discard the current model (NHPP1), move to the better model
(NHPP2), and repeat the process by comparing that model with the next
model (BARISTA). Alternatively, if the likelihood-ratio statistic is insignif-
icant (p-value > 0.05), we stop and retain the current model as the best
model.
5. Empirical results.
5.1. Data. We collected data from eBay.com on closed auctions for three
types of products: Palm M515 personal digital assistants, Microsoft Xbox
games and Cartier premium wristwatches. The data include auctions of three
different durations: 3-day, 5-day and 7-day auctions. Relevant statistics are
given in Table 2.
5.2. Estimation. We describe the estimation process only for the 7-day
Palm bid arrival times. The same approach was used to estimate parameters
for all other datasets, and we report the estimate for the entire dataset in
the end.
5.2.1. Initial quick and crude estimation. Based on previous empirical
results, we chose the first day for estimating α1, that is, we believe that bids
placed during the first day are contained within the first “early bidding”
stage. Looking at the estimate as a function of the interval chosen (Figure
7, left panel), we see that the estimate is between 4–5 if we use the first
1–2 days. It is interesting to note that after the first two days, the estimate
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decreases progressively reaching αˆ1 = 2.5 on the interval [0.01,3], indicating
that the changepoint d1 is around 2.
The parameter α3 was estimated using (10) with t
′
3 = 7− 0.1/10080 and
a range of values for t3. From these, α3 appears to be approximately 1. It
can be seen in the right panel of Figure 7 that this estimate is relatively
stable within the last 10 minutes. Also, notice that selecting t3 too close
to t′3 results in unreliable estimates (due to a small number of observations
between the two values).
Finally, we chose the interval [3,6.9] for estimating α2. This yielded the
estimate αˆ2 = 0.36. Figure 8 shows the estimate as a function of the interval
choice. Note that the estimate is stable between 0.2–0.4 for the different
intervals chosen. It is more sensitive to the choice of t2, the upper bound
of the interval, and thus an overly conservative interval could yield large
inaccuracies.
Using these estimates (αˆ1 = 4.3, αˆ2 = 0.36, αˆ3 = 1), we estimated d1 and
d2. Figure 9 shows graphs of the estimates as a function of the intervals
selected. The estimate for d1 (left panel) appears to be stable at approxi-
mately dˆ1 = 1.75. The estimate for d2 (right panel) appears to be around
2 minutes. From the increasing values obtained for T − t3 > 3 minutes, we
also learn that d2 < 3.
5.3. Further refinement: ML and GA. Table 3 displays the above esti-
mates and compares them to the two other estimation methods: An exhaus-
tive search over a reasonable range of the parameter space (around the quick
and crude estimates) and the much quicker genetic algorithm. We restricted
Fig. 7. Quick and crude estimates of α1 as a function of t1 (with t
′
1 = 0.001) (left) and
of α3 as a function of t3 (with t
′
3 = 0.5/10080) (right). αˆ1 is stable around 5 for t1 in the
range 0.75–1.75 days. A shorter interval does not contain enough data. A longer interval
leads to a drop in the estimate, indicating that d1 < 2. αˆ3 is around 1.1 when t3 is within
the last 2–4 minutes.
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Fig. 8. Quick and crude estimate of α2 as a function of [t
′
2, t2]. Shorter, “safer” intervals
are at the lower right. Longer intervals, containing more data, are at the upper left. αˆ2 is
between 0.2–0.4 for all intervals. For t2 > 6.9, the estimate is approximately 0.35.
the range of possible solutions for the genetic algorithm to the hypercube
(α1, α2, α3, d1, d2) ∈ [0,10]× [0,1]× [0,5]× [0,5]× [0, 1000 min]. It can be seen
that all methods yielded estimates in the same vicinity.
We also performed model selection to see whether a 2-stage or 1-stage
model would sufficiently fit the data. The low p-values for comparing the
3-stage model with these models showed that indeed a 3-stage model is
preferable and more accurately approximates the data. For a detailed fitting
of the data to an NHPP1 (which includes the Poisson as a special case) and
an NHPP2, see Shmueli et al. (2004).
Fig. 9. Plots of dˆ1 vs. t1 (left) and dˆ2 vs. initial values of T − t3 (right) for Palm data.
The estimate for d1 seems stable at ≈ 1.75. dˆ2 is approximately 2 minutes.
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Fig. 10. Q–Q plot of Palm bid times vs. simulated data from a BARISTA process with
parameters α1 = 4.9, α2 = 0.37, α3 = 1.13, d1 = 1.7, d2 = 2/10080.
Finally, to further validate this estimated model, we simulated data from a
BARISTA process with the above ML estimates as parameters, and number
of bids equal to that in the respective dataset. Figure 10 shows a QQ-plot of
the Palm data vs. the simulated data. The points appear to fall on the line
x= y, thus, supporting the adequacy of the estimated model for the Palm
bid times.
The estimated model for the Palm data reveals the dynamics of these
auctions over time: Indeed, the “average” auction has three stages: the initial
stage takes place during the first 1.7 days, the middle stage continues until
the last 2 minutes, and then the third stage kicks in. The bid arrivals in each
of the three stages have different intensity functions. The auction beginning
is characterized by an early surge of interest, with more intense bidding
than during the start of the second stage. Then, the increase in bid arrival
rate slows down during the middle of the auction. The bids do tend to
arrive faster as the auction progresses, but at the very end, during the last
2 minutes of the auction, we observe a uniform bid arrival process. Finally,
it is interesting to note that in these data the third stage of bidding seems
Table 3
Estimates for five BARISTA model parameters using the three estimation methods
αˆ1 αˆ2 αˆ3 dˆ1 dˆ2 (minutes)
CDF-based Q&C 4.3 (0.02) 0.36 (0.001) 1 (0.02) 1.8 (0.009) 3.3 (0.18)
Exhaustive search 4.9 0.37 1.13 1.7 2.0
Genetic algorithm 5.55 (0.005) 0.35 (0.005) 1.1 (0.01) 1.55 (0.005) 2.0 (0.10)
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to take place within the last 2–3 minutes compared to the last 1 minute in
Roth and Ockenfels (2000). Thus, we use the term “last-moment bidding”
rather than “last-minute bidding.”
5.4. Comparing auctions. Table 4 gives the estimated BARISTA coeffi-
cients for all nine datasets. In all cases the fit was obtained by the process
described above, using a GA-based model selection procedure and refining
the estimates using an exhaustive search over the likelihood.
We can see that except for one dataset (5-day Xbox auctions), a three-
stage (BARISTA) model provided the best fit among the one-, two- and
three-stage models. Also, in all cases the final fit of the model to the data,
evaluated by examining QQ-plots, was very good. The last phase lasted a
couple of minutes or less in all auctions, irrespective of the auction dura-
tion, and there was more consistency within a certain item than within a
certain duration. The first stage tends to last 1–2 days, with one excep-
tion being 4 days (7-day Cartier auctions). Another common feature is the
magnitude of α2, around 0.3, indicating that during the second phase the
bidding frequency is equivalently low in different items’ auctions and in dif-
ferent durations. The bidding intensity during the last short stage, α3, is
also typically around 1, with two datasets reaching nearly 3.
The parameter that varies most across datasets is α1, the “early bidding”
frequency. It appears that the 3-day auctions exhibit a lower level of early
bidding compared to the longer duration auctions. However, there still does
exist such a stage even in these “short” auctions.
Finally, from a computational complexity point, the GA with model-
selection ran reasonably fast, with the longest estimation taking 11 minutes.
The runtimes are summarized in Table 5.
Table 4
Estimated BARISTA coefficients for all 9 datasets, using a GA-based model selection and
an exhaustive search over the likelihood function of the selected set of models
# stages αˆ1 αˆ2 αˆ3 dˆ1 dˆ2 (min)
7-days 3 10 0.24 1.19 1.2 2
Xbox 5-days 2 – 0.3 7.7 – 1
3-days 3 2.1 0.3 2.99 1.3 1.8
7-days 3 4.9 0.37 1.13 1.7 2
Palm 5-days 3 2.7 0.32 0.79 1.8 2
3-days 3 1.8 0.33 1.01 1.45 1.4
7-days 3 2.6 0.29 2.95 4 0.5
Cartier 5-days 3 3.1 0.35 1.08 2.4 0.51
3-days 3 1.5 0.31 0.88 1.8 1
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Table 5
Computational complexity of the GA: The table lists the
run-time of the GA (recorded in minutes) for the 9 data sets
described in Section 5
Data Palm XBox Cartier
3-day 3.27 1.35 0.45
5-day 2.19 1.09 1.03
7-day 11.27 5.34 3.54
6. Relating bidder arrivals and bid arrivals. The online auction litera-
ture is rich with papers that assume an ordinary homogenous Poisson bid-
der arrival process. This assumption underlies various theoretical deriva-
tions, is the basis for the simulation of bid data, and is used to design
field experiments. Bajari and Hortacsu (2000) specify and estimate a struc-
tural econometric model of bidding on eBay, assuming a Poisson bidder
arrival process. Etzion et al. (2003) suggest a model for segmenting con-
sumers at dual channel online merchants. Based on the assumption of Pois-
son arrivals to the website, they model consumer choice of channel, simu-
late consumer arrivals and actions, and compute relationships between auc-
tion duration, lot size and the constant Poisson arrival rate λ. Zhang et al.
(2002) model the demand curve for consumer products in online auctions
based on Poisson bidder arrivals, and fit the model to bid data. Pinker et al.
(2003) and Vakrat and Seidmann (2000) use a Poisson process for model-
ing the arrival of bidders in going-going-gone auctions. They use the inten-
sity function λ(t) = λae
−t/T , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , where T is the auction duration,
and λa is the intensity of website traffic into the auction. This model de-
scribes the decline in the number of new bidders as the auction progresses.
Haubl and Popkowski Leszczyc (2003) design and carry out an experiment
for studying the effect of fixed-price charges (e.g., shipping costs) and reserve
prices on consumer’s product valuation. The experiment uses simulated data
that are based on Poisson arrivals of bidders. These studies are among the
many that rely on a Poisson arrival process assumption.
In online auctions, however, bidder arrivals are unobserved as we pointed
out earlier. Therefore, it is not straightforward to study their distribution.
On the other hand, bid arrivals are observed. In the following we investigate
the relationship between bidder arrivals and bid arrivals more carefully.
6.1. Poisson bidder arrivals yield NHPP bid arrivals. We now establish a
key connection between the bidder arrival and bid arrival processes. Suppose
that bidders enter an auction in accordance with a Poisson process having a
fixed rate λ, and that a bidder who arrives at time s places a single bid on
the interval [s,T ) according to a bid time distribution Gs. The resulting bid
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arrival process is similar to the output process of an M/G/∞ queue, except
that the service time (the elapsed time between a bidder’s arrival and the
placement of his bid) is dependent on the arrival time of the bidder.
By Proposition 2.3.2 of Ross (1995), the bid counts on nonoverlapping
subintervals of [0, T ], are independent variables, and hence the bid arrival
process possesses independent increments. Moreover, the bid count on [0, y]
is Poisson distributed with mean∫ y
0
λGs(y)ds=
∫ y
0
λ
[∫ y
s
dGs(t)dt
]
ds
=
∫ y
0
[
λ
∫ t
0
dGs(t)ds
]
dt
=
∫ y
0
[
λ
∫ t
0
gs(t)ds
]
dt (if Gs has a derivative gs),
and hence, if Gs has derivative gs, then the bid arrival process is a nonho-
mogeneous Poisson process with intensity function λ(t) = λ
∫ t
0 gs(t)ds. The
function gs is the link between the bidder arrival process and the result-
ing bid arrival process. Suppose, for example, that a bidder who arrives at
time s places a single bid uniformly on the remaining interval (s,T ). Then,
gs(t) = 1/(T − s) so that λ(t) = λ log(T/(T − t)). Thus, fixed rate Poisson
(uniform) bidder arrivals, in conjunction with uniform placement of their
single bids, yields a nonhomogeneous Poisson process of bid arrivals with an
intensity that increases as the auction deadline approaches.
6.2. Poisson bidder arrivals yield BARISTA bid arrivals. Continuing the
discussion in Section 6.1, we describe a naturally arising bid time distribution
that yields a BARISTA bid arrival process. Suppose that a bidder who
arrives at time s1 places his bid immediately (at time s1) with probability
α > 0, and makes no further bids, or otherwise selects s2 ∼ U(s1, T ) as his
next potential bid time. At time s2 he again places his bid with probability
α, and makes no further bids, or otherwise selects s3 ∼ U(s2, T ) as his next
potential bid time. Continuing in this manner, the bidder eventually places
his single bid and then departs the auction. By the discussion in Section 6.1,
the resulting bid arrival process is a nonhomogeneous Poisson process.
To derive the form of the intensity function, let τ denote the bid time of
a randomly chosen bidder. The intensity function λ is a constant multiple
of ddtP (τ ≤ t). By Lemma 1 of Appendix C (set a= 0 and b= T ), we have
λ(t) = (const )
d
dt
P (τ ≤ t) = (const) d
dt
{
1−
(
1− t
T
)α}
(21)
= (const )
(
1− t
T
)α−1
, 0≤ t≤ T.
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This is the intensity function of our NHPP1.
To obtain NHPP2 bid arrivals with α2 = α and α3 = 1, we alter the above
set-up so that a bidder who selects a potential bid time after T − d either
places a bid at that time (with probability α) or otherwise leaves the auction
without placing a bid (or the one bid he attempts to place on [T − d,T ] fails
to transmit). Note that this variation produces uniformly distributed bid
arrivals on (T − d,T ].
To generalize further to NHPP2 bid arrivals with 0 < α2 ≤ α3 ≤ 1, we
replace α by α2 on [0, T − d], and by α3 on (T − d,T ]. We also assign
probability 1−α2/α3 to the event that a bidder who has not placed his bid
by time T − d ultimately departs the auction without bidding. Let τ denote
the bid time of a bidder chosen randomly from those who successfully place
a bid. By multiple applications of Lemma 1 of Appendix C,
P (τ ≤ t) =

1
pi
{
1−
(
1− t
T
)α2}
, for 0≤ t < T − d,
1− 1
pi
α2
α3
(
d
T
)α2(T − t
d
)α3
, for T − d≤ t≤ T ,
where pi denotes the probability that a randomly chosen bidder successfully
places a bid [pi is equal to 1− ( dT )α2(1− α2α3 )]. We have for some c > 0
λ(t) = (const)
d
dt
P (τ ≤ t)
=

c
(
1− t
T
)α2−1
, for 0≤ t < T − d,
c
(
d
T
)α2−α3(
1− t
T
)α3−1
, for T − d≤ t≤ T .
This is the intensity function of our NHPP2.
7. Discussion. Empirical research on bid timing in online auctions has
been exploratory and data-driven. The BARISTA model is the first pro-
posed probabilistic model for the bid arrival process in online auctions. This
probabilistic foundation provides an improved platform for quantifying bid
arrival processes and for simulating data, and is a first step for establishing
models of bidder strategies (as shown in Section 6). It can also be used to
improve nonparametric representations of price-processes in online auctions
[e.g., used for clustering auctions in Jank and Shmueli (2007) or for fore-
casting ongoing auctions in Wang et al. (2007)], by specifying the amount
and locations of knots in the smoothing splines.
One possible extension of the current BARISTA formulation is to auctions
of random duration. An alternative to the popular fixed-length format (as on
eBay) is a format whereby the closing time is extended, beyond the scheduled
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deadline if necessary, until a predetermined number of minutes have passed
without a bid being submitted. This is known as a popcorn ending (as on
Amazon.com). Extending the BARISTA model in this direction is likely to
require an additional fourth phase and a modification to the bid intensity
in the third phase, as the parameter T has a different role in the alternative
format. Formulating such a model and fitting it to real data is an interesting
future direction. An enhanced BARISTA that models the bivariate process
of bid arrivals and bid amounts is also of interest, as is the probabilistic
formulation of bidder arrivals and strategies that lead to BARISTA bid
arrivals.
APPENDIX A: ML ESTIMATION OF THE UNCONDITIONAL
BARISTA MODEL
Let N(s),0≤ s≤ T, be a NHPP with an intensity function of the form
λ(s) = cg(θ, s), 0≤ s≤ T,
where c and θ = (θ1, . . . , θk) are unknown parameters. Define h(θ) =∫ T
0 g(θ, s)ds, so that m(T ) = ch(θ). The pdf associated with λ is f(θ, s) =
λ(s)/m(T ), 0 ≤ s ≤ T. Given a random sample x1, . . . , xn (nonrandom n)
from this distribution, the likelihood and log-likelihood functions of θ are
L(θ) =
n∏
i=1
f(θ,xi) and L(θ) = lnL(θ).
On the other hand, given the value n ofN(T ), and the arrival times x1, . . . , xn
from the NHPP, the likelihood function of (c, θ) is given by
L(c, θ) =
e−m(T )m(T )n
n!
n∏
i=1
f(θ,xi) =
e−ch(θ)(ch(θ))n
n!
L(θ).
The log-likelihood is thus
L(c, θ) =−ch(θ) + n lnc+ n lnh(θ)− lnn! +L(θ).
The joint MLE of c and θ is the solution of the equations
0 =
∂L(c, θ)
∂c
=−h(θ) + n
c
,
(A.1)
0 =
∂L(c, θ)
∂θj
=−c∂h(θ)
∂θj
+
n
h(θ)
∂h(θ)
∂θj
+
∂L(θ)
∂θj
, 1≤ j ≤ k.
Solving the first equation in (A.1) for c and plugging into the second, we
find that
∂L(c, θ)
∂θj
=
∂L(θ)
∂θj
, 1≤ j ≤ k.
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Hence, L(c, θ) and L(θ) yield the same MLE for θ. That is, if θ̂j =
wj(X1, . . . ,Xn) is the MLE of θj (1 ≤ j ≤ k) based on a random sample
of nonrandom size n from the distribution with the pdf above, then the
MLE of θj based on the arrival times X1, . . . ,XN(T ) from the above NHPP
is of the form θ̂j = wj(X1, . . . ,XN(T )). By the first equation in (A.1), the
MLE of c is
ĉ=
N(T )
h(θ̂)
.(A.2)
APPENDIX B: SECOND DERIVATIVES OF THE LOG-LIKELIHOOD
FUNCTION
The second derivatives are given for using gradient methods of ML esti-
mation such as Newton Raphson:
∂2L
∂2α1
=− n
C2
(
∂C
∂α1
)2
+
n
C
∂2C
∂2α1
(B.1)
=
n
C2
(
∂C
∂α1
)2
− n
C
(
2
α1
+ ln
(
1− d1
T
))
∂C
∂α1
,
∂2L
∂2α2
=− n
C2
(
∂C
∂α2
)2
+
n
C
∂2C
∂2α2
=
n
C2
(
∂C
∂α2
)2
+
2n
α2C
∂C
∂α2
− nCT
α2
[
1
α3
(
d2
T
)α2
ln
d2
T
(
2 + (α2 − α3) ln d2
T
)
(B.2)
− 1
α1
(
1− d1
T
)α2
ln
(
1− d1
T
)(
1−
(
1− d1
T
)−α1)
×
(
2 + α2 ln
(
1− d1
T
))]
,
∂2L
∂2α3
=− n
C2
(
∂C
∂α3
)2
+
n
C
∂2C
∂2α3
=
n
C2
(
∂C
∂α3
)2
− nα3
2C
∂C
∂α3
,(B.3)
∂2L
∂α1α2
=
2
C
∂C
∂α1
∂C
∂α2
+ ln
(
1− d1
T
)
∂C
∂α1
,(B.4)
∂2L
∂α1α3
=
2
C
∂C
∂α1
∂C
∂α3
,(B.5)
∂2L
∂α2α3
=
2
C
∂C
∂α2
∂C
∂α3
+ ln
(
d2
T
)
∂C
∂α3
.(B.6)
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APPENDIX C: A GEOMETRIC SERIES OF SHRINKING UNIFORM
VARIABLES
Lemma 1. Suppose X1 ∼ U(a, b),X2 ∼ U(X1, b),X3 ∼ U(X2, b), . . . and
M ∼ geom(α). Then,
P (XM > s) =
(
1− s− a
b− a
)α
, a≤ s≤ b.
Proof. For convenience, assume a= 0 and b= 1. Define p(s) = P (XM >
s). For small x,
p(s+ x) = p(s)P (XM > s+ x|XM > s)
≥ p(s)
[(
1− x
1− s
)
+
(
x
1− s
)
(1−α)
(
1− x
1− s
)]
,
and thus,
lim inf
x→0
p(s+ x)− p(s)
x
≥ −αp(s)
1− s .(C.1)
Moreover,
p(s+ x)≤ p(s)
[(
1− x
1− s
)
+
x(1− α)
1− s
]
,
so that
lim sup
x→0
p(s+ x)− p(s)
x
≤ −αp(s)
1− s .(C.2)
By (C.1) and (C.2), p′(s) =−αp(s)(1− s)−1, from which we conclude that
p(s) = (1− s)α. 
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